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Abstrat
We onsider a neo-Keynesian model with staggered pries and wages. When both ontrats exhibit sluggish
adjustment to market onditions, the poliy maker faes a trade-o between stabilizing three welfare relevant vari-
ables: output, prie ination and wage ination. We onsider a monetary poliy rule designed aordingly: the
Central Banker an reat to both inations and the output gap. We generalize the Taylor priniple in this ase:
it embeds the frontier of determinay derived with staggered pries only, it is also symmetri in prie and wage
inations. It follows that when staggered labour ontrats are onsidered, wage ination is also an illegible and
eient target for the Central Banker.
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1
Introdution
In (Taylor, 1993), John Taylor advoates the use of monetary poliy rules where the Central Banker reats to both
prie ination and output as a benhmark to be used judgementally. His design of Wiksellian rule has been extensively
studied sine then in the ontext of neo-Keynesian models. In suh models, two normative questions arise:
1
 What kind of poliy rule an ahieve a soial welfare optimum?
 How an one rule out sun-spot utuations (as desribed by (Woodford, 1987))?
In both respets, it has been shown that the Taylor rule has appealing properties (Woodford, 2001): in the sim-
plest neo-Keynesian model, the Taylor rule an be proved optimal in terms of welfare under some assumptions
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). It is also key in enforing solution determinay: the Taylor priniple states that
the Central Banker's reation to ination must be large enough to ensure the uniqueness of the solution under rational
expetations.
2
These results hold under staggered pries and exible wages. When onsidering both staggered pries
and wages, some of the appealing properties of the standard neo-Keynesian model are weakened. (Blanhard and Gali,
2007) show that allowing for both rigidities generates a trade-o between stabilizing ination and output even in the
absene of ost-push shoks:
3
the soial optimum ould be ahieved when only staggered pries were onsidered, it is
no longer the ase with both staggered ontrats. (Ereg et al., 2000) study the welfare impliations of the addition
of staggered wages. They show that is not possible for the monetary poliy to fully stabilize more than one of the
three objetives: prie ination, wage ination or output, but the variane of eah is detrimental to welfare. Using
numerial simulations, they also show that sole prie or wage ination targeting is suboptimal in this ontext, but a
poliy rule suh as suggested by Taylor or with reations to both prie and wage inations performs nearly as well as
the optimal rule.
In this paper, we onsider the same model as (Galí, 2008, hapter 6) or (Ereg et al., 2000) but are mainly onerned
with the problem of sun spot utuations instead of welfare optimization. We onsider a monetary poliy rule in line
with Ereg et al.'s results: the Central Banker an reat to both inations and the output gap. With straightforward
notations, the monetary poliy rule takes the following form:
it = Φpπ
p
t +Φwπ
w
t +Φyyt
We nd that the neessary and suient ondition to rule out sun-spot equilibria is symmetri in inations:
Φp +Φw +
1− β
κ˜
Φy > 1
with β households' disount fator and κ˜ a oeient depending symmetrially on both slopes of the pries and wages
Phillips urves.
The frontier of the Taylor priniple with staggered pries only is Φp+
1−β
κ
Φy > 1 with κ the slope of the Phillips urve
on pries (Woodford, 2001). Our results thus generalizes the frontier derived is this simpler ase. Though the model's
symmetry may not appear straightforward, similar symmetry arises when studying the optimal monetary poliy (see
the funtional form of the welfare riterion derived both by Galí and Ereg et al.). The intuition for this symmetry is
given by Blanhard and Gali's omment on (Ereg et al., 2000). In the simple model with staggered pries only, the
Phillips urve implies that stabilizing prie ination is equivalent to stabilizing the output gap, a result they present
as a divine oinidene beause it allows the Central Banker to enfore the soial optimum. But, as aforementioned,
they show that with the addition of staggered wages, this result no longer holds. In Ereg et al.'s model, they note a
weaker form of this oinidene: ombining the two Phillips urves yields that stabilizing the output gap is equivalent
to stabilizing a weighted average of prie and wage ination (with the weight on eah ination being the slope of the
others Phillips urve).
In the remainder of this paper, the rst setion realls the model. We expose some general mathematial properties
of this model in setion 2 when the Central Banker an only reat to pries and wages ination (Φy = 0). We then
1
These questions are independent of one another: optimal rules do not neessarily avoid sun-spot utuations (Clarida et al., 1999)
2
(Bullard and Mitra, 2002) shows that the properties of this priniple are also key in a model with adaptive learning
3
In presene of ost-push shoks there is a short run trade-o between the two objetives (Clarida et al., 1999)
2
study the uniqueness of its solution in this ase (Φy = 0) (setions 3, 4 and 5). We rst onsider the limit subase
Φp + Φw = 1 (setion 3). In setion 4, we study the deviations from this subase (Φp + Φw ≷ 1). In setion 5 we
derive the frontier of the Taylor priniple when Φy = 0. Finally we expand this result to the ase where the Central
Banker an also reat to the output gap (Φy 6= 0) in setion 6. Readers not familiar with this literature an nd in
appendix some general elements on neo-Keynesian models for monetary poliy solved under rational expetations in
whih we expose the general set-up of this problem.
1 A monetary model with stiky wages and pries
We study the model exposed in (Galí, 2008, hap 6) and (Ereg et al., 2000). This model extends the standard neo-
Keynesian model for monetary poliy analysis whih onsist of an IS urve relating the output gap to the expeted
real interest rate, a Phillips urve relating ination, expeted ination and output gap and a monetary poliy rule
desribing how the interest rate is set by the Central Banker. The present extension of the model onsiders wage
rigidities under the form of Calvo ontrats. It follows from this rigidity that real wages may deviate from their
exible equivalent due to exogenous disturbanes.
The model takes the following linear form:
4
π
p
t = βE(π
p
t+1|t) + κpyt + λpωt (1)
πwt = βE(π
w
t+1|t) + κwyt − λwωt (2)
ωt−1 = ωt − πwt + πpt +∆ωnt (3)
yt = E(yt+1|t)− 1
σ
(it − E(πpt+1|t)− rnt ) (4)
it = Φpπ
p
t +Φwπ
w
t +Φyyt + vt (5)
In this system, at eah date t, a set of variables (πp, πw, ω, y, i) are determined by their urrent and past value and
their expeted value at the following date (E(.|t), is the rational expetations operator at date t, i.e. the expetation
onditional on the values of every variables up to date t and the model itself). Equations (1) and (2) are the Phillips
urves on prie ination (πp) and wage ination (πw). They desribe the progressive adjustment of pries and wages to
market onditions. Pries may inrease with expeted ination or the marginal ost of prodution. This ost depends
positively on the output gap (yt, dened as the deviation of output from its fully exible equivalent) and the real wage
gap (ωt, dened as the deviation of real wage from its fully exible equivalent). Wages may inrease with expeted
wage ination or derease with the wage mark-up (taken in deviation from the exible ontrats ase). This mark-up
depends positively on the real wage gap and negatively on the output gap. Equation (3) desribes the fat that beause
of nominal rigidities, real wages depart from their fully exible ounterpart. Exogenous shoks to the eonomy aeting
the real wage (∆ωn) are not instantaneously transmitted to the atual real wage but only to its exible ounterpart,
hene driving a wedge between inations and the dynami of the real wage gap. Equation (4) desribes the evolution
of the output gap (y) as a funtion of interest rate (i) and expeted ination. The impliit assumption here is that
output is driven, in the short run, by private demand. rnt is the natural rate of interest, that is the real interest
rate whih would prevail under fully exible ontrats. Equation (5) desribes the interest rate deision of the Central
Banker. It is a Taylor rule modied to aount for the fat that the Central Banker may reat to wages ination as well
as pries ination. The higher inations or output are, the higher the Central Banker will set the interest rate in or-
der to temper the eonomi growth. Moreover, the Central Banker may depart from this rule for exogenous reasons (v).
The parameters of this model are:
 0 < β < 1, is the disount fator of households.
 σ ≥ 0, is the inverse intertemporal elastiity of substitution of onsumption.
 Φp > 0, is the Central Banker's reation to prie ination.(Taylor, 1993) onsiders Φp = 1.5
4
The omplete derivation of the model is exposed in full details in (Galí, 2008, hap 6) with the same notations
3
 Φw ≥ 0 is the Central Banker's reation to wage ination. In the standard ases the Central Banker only reat
to prie ination (Φw = 0)
 Φy ≥ 0 is the Central Banker's reation to the output gap. (Taylor, 1993) onsiders Φy = 0.5.
 λp =
(1−θp)(1−βθp)
θp
1−α
1−α+αεp
, where
 0 < θp < 1, is the Calvo parameter on pries, in other words the stikiness of pries (if 0, pries are fully
exible)
 0 < α < 1, with 1− α the elastiity of output with respet to labour
 0 < εp ≤ 1, is the elastiity of substitution among goods
⇒ 0 < λp
 λw =
(1−θw)(1−βθw)
θw(1+ϕεw)
, where
 0 < θw < 1, is the Calvo parameter on wages, in other words the stikiness of wages (if 0, wages are fully
exible)
 0 < ϕ, is the Frish elastiity, in other words the onvexity of the ost of labour in terms of welfare.
 0 < εw ≤ 1, is the elastiity of substitution among labour types
⇒ 0 < λw
 κp =
αλp
1−α , we will also denote later λpnp = κp with np > 0
 κw = λw(σ+
ϕ
1−α ) whih implies κw ≥ λwσ. We will also denote later λwnw = κw with nw > 0 or κw = λw(σ+ν)
with ν > 0.
Denoting xt = [yt, π
p
t , π
w
t , ωt−1]
T
, the endogenous variables, and zt = [r
n
t − vt, ∆ωnt ]T , the exogenous variables, the
equations (1) to (5) an be written in the form:
xt = A
−1 ( E(xt+1|t) +B zt) (6)
In the equation (6), the matrix of interest A is:
A =


1 +
κp
σβ
+
Φy
σ
βΦp − 1− λp
σβ
βΦw + λp
σβ
λp
σβ
−κp
β
1 + λp
β
−λp
β
−λp
β
−κw
β
−λw
β
1 + λw
β
λw
β
0 −1 1 1


(7)
There are three forward looking variables in this models: ([yt, π
p
t , π
w
t ]).
Lemma 1 Aording to (Blanhard and Kahn, 1980), the system (6) has a unique solution if and only if the matrix
A dened by (7) has 3 eigenvalues stritly larger than one in modulus and one eigenvalue stritly smaller than one in
modulus.
In this ase, there is numerial evidene that the sum Φp + Φw should be larger than 1 when Φy = 0 to meet this
ondition. When Φy 6= 0, the ondition on Φp + Φw is dereasing with Φy (Galí, 2008). Nevertheless, a formal proof
to these properties has not been given yet, it is the main objetive of this paper.
4
Main results In the remainder of this paper we show that any monetary poliy rule satisfying
Φp +Φw +Φy
(1− β)
(nw + np)
(
1
λp
+
1
λw
)
> 1 (8)
rules out sunspot equilibria.
The admissibility of a poliy rule symmetrially depends on wage ination and pries ination: when the entral bank
does not respond to hanges in output, the ondition for monetary poliy omes down to Φp + Φw > 1 in line with
Galí's numerial investigations.
Also in line with Galí's numerial investigations, when the entral bank reats to hanges in output, doing so relaxes
the onstraint above, proportionally to Φy with a fator
(1−β)
(nw+np)
(
1
λp
+ 1
λw
)
. This oeient ruially and symmetri-
ally depends on the Phillips urves of pries and wages: more impatient agents (smaller β) or atter Phillips urves
(smaller λ or n), failitate the task of the Central Banker to prevent sun spot utuations.
In this model, a permanent shift in prie ination (π˜) implies an idential permanent shift in wage ination (equa-
tion (3)). The Phillips urves (equations (1) and (2)) imply a proportional shift in output gap y˜ = (1−β)(nw+np)
(
1
λp
+ 1
λw
)
π˜.
In turn, the Taylor rule (5) implies that the reation of the Central Banker is to raise the nominal interest rate by
i˜ =
[
Φp +Φw +Φy
(1−β)
(nw+np)
(
1
λp
+ 1
λw
)]
π˜. Thus, as in the standard neo-Keynesian model without wage rigidities
(Woodford, 2011, hapter 4), our frontier of indeterminay an also be interpreted in terms of the Taylor priniple:
the Central Banker reating more than one for one to permanent hanges in ination.
Using Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011), it is possible to verify numerially frontier (8).
5
(Galí, 2008, hapter 6) and
(Ereg et al., 2000) show that wage ination targeting ompares with prie ination targeting in terms of welfare.
Using Dynare it is possible to onrm their result of symmetry by omputing the optimal oeients for the monetary
poliy rule onsidered here.
6
When onsidering a Central Banker reating to both inations and the output gap, we
nd Φp = 47.1, Φw = 67.8, Φy = 231.9. This optimal rule implies a very sensitive interest rate whih is standard
when the benets of a smoothed monetary poliy are not onsidered. More interestingly, the reations of the optimal
interest rate to both inations are omparable.
Wage ination and prie ination play similar roles for the design of the optimal monetary poliy, we show that they
also play symmetri roles for eliminating sun-spot utuations. This extended onlusion remains "at odds with the
pratie of most entral banks, whih seem to attah little weight to wage ination as a target variable"(Galí, 2008).
Outline of the proof Dening the frontier of indeterminay is based on the study of the roots of the harateristi
polynomial of matrix A, a fourth degree polynomial. Though it is not omplex mathematis, it is rather umbersome.
We are partiularly grateful to Yvon Maday and other mathematiians at Laboratoire Jaques-Louis Lions for proof-
reading and omments.
In setions 2 to 5 we develop the proof in the ase Φy = 0. In setion 2 we study the general properties of this
polynomial and its oeients. We use the intuition that in this ase the frontier of determinay is Φp + Φw = 1
and deompose the polynomial as a fourth degree polynomial orresponding to this ase plus deviations from this
ase in both diretions (Φp, Φw). In setion 3 we study the polynomial in the ase Φp + Φw = 1 to show that:
1 is a root of this polynomial; its real roots are non-negative; its omplex roots have a modulus stritly greater
than one; and at most one real root is in ]0, 1[. In setion 4 we study the deviations from Φp + Φw = 1; we show
that these deviations are seond degree polynomials with positive real roots, one stritly greater than one the other
stritly smaller than one. In setion 5 we study how the deviations from Φp + Φw = 1 modies the roots of the
harateristi polynomial. The omplex roots annot enter the unit irle. The real roots stritly greater or lower
5
Code available upon request
6
The welfare riterion to be optimized is derived in Galí, we use his benhmark alibration and in line with his methodology onsider
tehnology shoks only.
5
than one are kept away from 1. The root 1 moves in the diretion ensuring the uniqueness of the model's solution
(depending on the existene of another root smaller than one) if and only if the deviation from Φp+Φw = 1 is positive.
In setion 6 we show that the ase Φy 6= 0 an be treated identially to the ase Φy = 0. We onsider the frontier of
indeterminay under the form Φp+Φw = 1−θ and show that setting θ = Φy (1−β)(nw+np)
(
1
λp
+ 1
λw
)
allows a deomposition
of the harateristi polynomial whih has the same properties as in the ase Φy = 0. We an onlude that equation
(8) generalizes the frontier of indeterminay.
6
2 Preliminary properties of the model's harateristi polynomial
Aording to what has been explained above, the uniqueness result probably holds if and only if Φw + Φp > 1 when
Φy = 0. We begin with the study of this limit ase Φw +Φp = 1. For that purpose, we introdue a new parameter φp
and use the following parametrization:
Φp = φp + ξ Φw = 1− φp + γ (9)
0 < φp < 1 ξ s.t Φp > 0 γ s.t. Φw > 0 (10)
Suh values of γ and ξ are alled admissible throughout the paper. The domain of interest, Dp,w, is oloured in blue
on Figure 1. This parametrization of Dp,w is not injetive, as three parameters (φp, ξ, γ) desribe a two dimensional
domain, but this hoie makes the study easier.
Φp
Φw
1
1
Φ
p +
Φ
w
=
1
P0,0
•
Pγ1,ξ1 •ξ1
γ1
P ′0,0 •
Pγ2,ξ2
ξ2
γ2
Dp,w
Figure 1: Domain of interest (in blue) and parametrization
Let X denote the vetor of the new parameters:
X = [β, φp, κp, λp, λw, σ, ν] ∈ ]0, 1[× ]0, 1[× (R∗+)5 = DX . (11)
it exludes γ and ξ, treated as speial parameters.
Remark 1 Please note that we use indistintly the following notations: κp = λpnp and κw = λwnw = λw(σ + ν).
The harateristi polynomial of the matrix dened in (7) above an be expressed as follows, with impliit dependeny
on X :
Pγ,ξ(t) = at
4 − bt3 + cγ,ξt2 − dγ,ξt+ eγ,ξ. (12)
7
with the oeients:
a = σβ2
b = β[κp + σ(2 + 2β + λp + λw)]
cγ,ξ = κp[1 + λw + β(1 + φp + ξ)] + λwν[λp + β(1 − φp) + βγ]
+ σ[1 + 4β + β2 + λp(1 + β) + λw(1 + λp + (2 − φp)β + βγ)]
dγ,ξ = κp[1 + λw + φp(1 + β) + λwγ + (1 + β + λw)ξ] + λwν[λp + (1− φp)(1 + β) + (1 + β + λp)γ + λpξ]
+ σ[2β + 2 + λp + λw(1 + λp + (1 + β)(1− φp) + (1 + β + λp)γ + λpξ)]
eγ,ξ = σ + κpφp + κpξ + λw(σ + ν)(1− φp) + λw(σ + ν)γ.
We denote omplex numbers z = ρ(cos θ + i sin θ) and
D = {z ∈ C s.t. |z| ≤ 1}. (13)
z is stritly in (resp. out of) D if |z| < 1 (resp. |z| > 1).
We adopt three onventions: a fourth degree polynomial P is said to satisfy the property
(i) if P has one root stritly in D and three roots stritly out of D,
(ii) if P has two real roots and two omplex roots,
(iii) if P has four real roots.
Aording to the explanation above, the uniqueness of the solution is equivalent to the fat that Pγ,ξ satises (i).
The polynomial Pγ,ξ satises the following properties
Property 1 For every vetor of parameters X ∈ DX , (a, b) ∈ (R∗+)2 and ∀ γ ≥ 0, ∀ ξ ≥ 0, (cγ,ξ, dγ,ξ, eγ,ξ) ∈ (R∗+)3.
This implies that ∀ t ≤ 0, Pγ,ξ(t) > 0.
Proof : The sign of the oeients derives from their denition and the denition (11) of DX . The sign of the
polynomial Pγ,ξ(t) derives from (12). 
Property 2 For every vetor of parameters X ∈ DX , for every γ > 0 and for every ξ > 0, Pγ,ξ has a root λ1 ∈ ]0, 1[
and a root λ∞ ∈ ]1,+∞[
Proof :
Pγ,ξ(1) = −λwλp(γ + ξ)(np + nw) and lim
+∞
Pγ,ξ = +∞
and as Pγ,ξ(0) > 0, the property is proved. 
Property 3 The following inequalities hold:
∀X ∈ DX ∀ γ ≥ 0 ∀ ξ ≥ 0 b > 4a cγ,ξ > 2a+ b > 6a eγ,ξ > a
Property 4 The disriminant of the seond order derivative P ′′γ is ∆(P
′′
γ,ξ) = 12 [3b
2 − 8acγ,ξ]. Moreover, ∀ γ ≥ 0,
∀ ξ ≥ 0 if 3b2 < 8acγ,ξ then Pγ,ξ has two onjugate omplex roots
Proof: If the disriminant of P ′′γ,ξ is negative, this polynomial is positive for every t. In this ase, P
′
γ,ξ is stritly
inreasing and has only one real root, and Pγ,ξ is stritly dereasing and then stritly inreasing. As we already know
that it has two real roots, the two others are omplex. 
8
From now on, we use the simplifying notations P0 = P0,0, c = c0,0, d = d0,0 and e = e0,0 and the following
deomposition:
Pγ,ξ(t) = P0(t) + γ λw Q(t) + ξ λp S(t) where (14)
Q(t) = βnw t
2 − [κp + nw(1 + β + λp)]t+ nw (15)
S(t) = βnp t
2 − [κw + np(1 + β + λw)]t+ np (16)
Property 5 For all X ∈ DX , P ′0(1) = 4a− 3b+ 2c− d and 6a− 3b+ c annot be both negative.
Proof: We proeed by ontradition
Assumption 1 Exists X ∈ DX suh that P ′0(1) = 4a− 3b+ 2c− d < 0 and 6a− 3b+ c < 0.
The rst inequality rewrites:
4a− 3b+ 2c− d = κp[λw + (1− β)(1 − φp)] + λwν[λp − (1− β)(1 − φp)]
+ σ[(1 − β)(λp + λwφp) + λwλp] < 0.
The only way to do so is:
λp < (1− β)(1 − φp) (17)
Reintroduing this into the last inequality, we obtain:
λwν >
κp[λw + (1− β)(1 − φp)] + σ[(1 − β)(λp + λwφp) + λwλp]
(1− β)(1 − φp)− λp = m. (18)
The seond inequality an be expressed as:
6a− 3b+ c = κp[λw + 1− β − β(1 − φp)] + λwν[λp + β(1 − φp)]
+ σ[(1 − β)2 + λp(1− β) + λw(1 + λp)− λpβ − λwβ(1 + φp)] < 0
and this implies another bound for λwν:
λwν <
−κp[λw + 1− β − β(1 − φp)]− σ[(1 − β)2 + λp(1 − β) + λw(1 + λp)− λpβ − λwβ(1 + φp)]
λp + β(1− φp) = M. (19)
Now let us denote by Dm and DM the denominators of m and M respetively, and ompute: ∆ ≡ (m−M)DmDM
∆ = κp[λw + (1− β)(1 − φp)][λp + β(1 − φp)] + σ[(1 − β)(λp + λwφp) + λwλp][λp + β(1 − φp)]
+ κp[λw + 1− β − β(1− φp)][(1 − β)(1 − φp)− λp]
+ σ[(1 − β)2 + λp(1− β) + λw(1 + λp)− λpβ − λwβ(1 + φp)][(1− β)(1 − φp)− λp]
= σ∆σ + κp∆κp
where, after simpliation:
∆σ = (1− β)(λp + 1− β)[(1 − β)(1 − φp)− λp] + λw(1− β)2(1− φp) + λpλwβ + λ2p
∆κp = (1− β)[(1 − β)(1 − φp)− λp] + (λp + λw)(1 − φp).
It is not diult to hek that the two ofators ∆σ and ∆κp are stritly positive. Hene, we obtain that m−M > 0
and this is not possible, onsidering (18) and (19). 
3 The eigenvalues in the limit ase Φp + Φw = 1: P0 study
P0 satises the property 1, but not the property 2 as explained below.
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Property 6 P0(1) = 0 and we an write P0(t) = (t− 1)R0(t) with
R0(t) = at
3 − (b − a)t2 + (a− b+ c)t+ a− b + c− d.
Moreover, P0 has at least one root stritly greater than one.
We are going to prove that R0 has at most one root in the unit disk D. We rst note that a− b+ c− d = −e, and the
property 3 enables us to tell that the produt of the roots of R0 is greater than one.
3.1 The real roots
Let us study the ase in whih P0 satises (iii), namely has four real roots. Thanks to property 4, we know that this
implies 3b2 > 8ac.
Lemma 2 If P0 has four real roots, at most one belongs to ]0, 1[.
Proof: Property 4, implies 3b2 > 8ac, and P ′′0 has two real roots, denoted t− and t+. As P
′′
0 (t) = 12at
2 − 6bt+ 2c,
we easily obtain that:
t± =
b
4a
±
((
b
4a
)2
− c
6a
) 1
2
.
Moreover
t− + t+ =
b
2a
> 2 t−t+ =
c
6a
> 1.
We rule out the ase in whih the three roots of R0 are smaller than one, beause the produt of these roots must be
larger than one, and proeed by ontradition:
Assumption 2 P0 has two roots (λi, λj) ∈ ]0, 1[× ]0, 1[.
Figure 2 shows how P0 ould look like under this assumption.
Figure 2: Example of a polynomial satisfying the assumption 2
A straightforward study of the variations of P0 and P
′
0 show that our assumption implies that P
′
0(1) < 0 and t− < 1.
This last inequality gives:
b
4a
− 1 <
((
b
4a
)2
− c
6a
) 1
2
⇐⇒
1− b
2a
< − c
6a
⇐⇒ 6a− 3b+ c < 0.
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Combining this with P ′0(1) < 0, we obtain that neessarily:
4a− 3b+ 2c− d < 0 6a− 3b+ c < 0 (20)
and this is in ontradition with property 5. 
3.2 The omplex roots
Now, we are interested in the possible omplex roots of P0.
Lemma 3 If P0 has two omplex roots z and z¯, they are onjugate and outside the unit disk: |z| > 1.
Proof: We proeed by ontradition.
Assumption 3 R0 has two omplex roots z = ρ(cos θ + i sin θ) and z¯ suh that δ = 1− ρ2 ≥ 0.
We have
R0(z) = aρ
3(cos3 θ − 3 cos θ sin2 θ) + (a− b)ρ2(cos2 θ − sin2 θ) + (a− b+ c)ρ cos θ+
a− b+ c− d+ i[aρ3(3 sin θ cos2 θ − sin3 θ) + 2(a− b)ρ2 sin θ cos θ + ρ(a− b + c) sin θ]
If R0(z) = 0, both its real and imaginary parts are equal to zero. Let us study the imaginary part, in whih ρ sin θ
an be put in fator. Hene, we fous on ℑ∗(R0(z)) in whih ℑ(R0(z)) = ρ sin θℑ∗(R0(z)) and
ℑ∗(R0(z)) = 4a(ρ cos θ)2 − 2(b− a)ρ cos θ + a(1− ρ2)− b+ c = F (ρ cos θ)
F (t) = 4a
(
t2 − 2(b− a)
4a
t+
δa− b+ c
4a
)
. (21)
Let us denote by r−F and r
+
F the two roots of F . It easily follows that
r±F =
b− a
4a
±
(
b − c− δa
4a
+
(
b− a
4a
)2) 12
.
Thanks to the assumption 3, we know that ρ ≤ 1, and as ℑ∗(R0(z)) = F (ρ cos θ), F has at least one real root in
]−1; 1[. The produt of the roots is greater than 32 , the sum is greater than 14 (due to property 3). Let us express a
neessary ondition to ensure that r−F < 1:
b − a
4a
−
(
b− c− δa
4a
+
(
b − a
4a
)2) 12
< 1 ⇐⇒
1− 2(b− a)
4a
<
b− c− δa
4a
⇐⇒ 4a− 2(b− a) < b− c− δa
⇐⇒ 6a− 3b+ c < −δa < 0. (22)
Next, let us remark that the produt of the four roots of P0 being greater than one and P0 vanishing in 1, the
assumption 3 ensures that the other real root is stritly greater than one. This implies that P ′0(1) < 0, and property 5
gives us the ontradition with (22). 
Property 7 For all θ ∈ ]0, π[, denoting by z = cos θ + i sin θ, we proved that
ℑ(R0(z)) = sin θ
[
4a(cos θ)2 − 2(b− a) cos θ − b+ c] > 0.
Proof: Obviously, ∀ θ ∈ ]0, π[, sin θ > 0. We showed in the last proof that the roots of the polynomial F dened by
(21) are stritly outside [0, 1], for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. For δ = 0, we obtain that
F (t) = 4at2 − 2(b− a)t− b+ c
Evaluating in t = 0, it follows that F (0) = c− b > 0 due to property 3. 
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Conlusion to P0 study We have showed that
(I) 1 is a root of P0,
(II) P0 has no negative root,
(III) if P0 has omplex roots, their modulus is stritly larger than one,
(IV) P0 has at most one root in ]0, 1[.
Figure 3 illustrates the four ongurations of roots for P0:
0.5 1 2 3
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
 case 1: 4 real roots, one of them < 1
1 2 3 4.5
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
 case 2: 4 real roots, all of them >= 1
0.5 1
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 case 3: 2 real roots, one < 1, 2 complex roots
1 2.5
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 case 4: 2 real roots, all > 1, 2 complex roots
Figure 3: The four possible ongurations of P0 roots: ases 1 to 4
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4 Deviations from the limit ase : Q and S study
In this setion, we study the polynomials Q and S dened, respetively, by (15) and (16). We give the expression of
their real roots, and study them for omplex values, to ease the proof of the nal theorem.
4.1 On the real axis
Let r−Q and r
+
Q denote the roots of Q.
Q(t) = βnwt
2 − [κp + nw(1 + β + λp)]t+ nw. (23)
The sum and the produt of the roots are non-negative, and we easily obtain that
∆Q
4
= − 1
β
+
1
4
(
1 +
1 + λp
β
+
κp
βnw
)2
>
1
4
(
1− 1
β
+
λp
β
+
κp
βnw
)2
.
Property 8 Q has two positive roots
r±Q =
1
2
(
1 +
1 + λp
β
+
κp
βnw
)
± 1
2
(
− 4
β
+
(
1 +
1 + λp
β
+
κp
βnw
)2) 12
r−Q ∈ ]0, 1[ and r+Q ∈
]
1
β
,+∞
[
.
Proof:
Q(0) = nw > 0 Q(1) = −λp(np + nw) < 0
We denote
B = 1 +
1 + λp
β
+
κp
βnw
∆ = B2 − 4
β
Let us assume that r+Q =
1
2 (B +
√
∆) ≤ 1
β
, then
√
∆ ≤ 2
β
−B ⇒ − 1
β
≤ 1
β2
− B
β
⇒ B ≤ 1 + 1
β
The last inequality does not hold. Hene, r+Q >
1
β
. 
Let r±S denote the two roots of S.
S(t) = βnpt
2 − [κw + np(1 + β + λw)]t+ np
the disriminant of S satises:
∆S
4
= − 1
β
+
1
4
(
1 +
1 + λw
β
+
κw
βnp
)2
>
1
4
(
1− 1
β
+
λw
β
+
κw
βnp
)2
.
Property 9 S has two positive roots
r±S =
1
2
(
1 +
1 + λw
β
+
κw
βnp
)
± 1
2
(
− 4
β
+
(
1 +
1 + λw
β
+
κw
βnp
)2) 12
r−S ∈ ]0, 1[ and r+S ∈
]
1
β
,+∞
[
.
Proof: The proof is symmetri to that of property 8. 
Property 10 Exists two real , t1 and t2 suh that t2 >
1
β
, t1 < 1 and ∀ t ∈ [t1, t2],
Q(t) < 0 and S(t) < 0.
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4.2 In the omplex plane C
We onsider here z = ρ(cos θ + i sin θ) and as we know that P0(1) = 0, we fous on
ℑ
(
Q(z)
z − 1
)
=
1
|z − 1|2ℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)) and
1
|z − 1|2ℑ(S(z)(z¯ − 1))
and we have
Q(z) = 2βnwρ
2 cos2 θ − [κp + nw(1 + β + λp)]ρ cos θ + (1 − β)nw
+ iρ sin θ[2βnwρ cos θ − κp − nw(1 + β + λp)]
S(z) = 2βnpρ
2 cos2 θ − [κw + np(1 + β + λw)]ρ cos θ + (1− β)np
+ iρ sin θ[2βnpρ cos θ − κw − np(1 + β + λw)].
All simpliations being made:
ℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)) = ρ sin θ [βnw(ρ− cos θ)2 + κp + nw(1 + β (1− cos θ)]
ℑ(S(z)(z¯ − 1)) = ρ sin θ [βnp(ρ− cos θ)2 + κw + np(1 + β (1 − cos θ)]
from whih we dedue the following property:
Property 11 For every θ ∈ ]0, π[, denoting z = ρ(cos θ + i sin θ) we have that:
ℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)) > 0 and ℑ(S(z)(z¯ − 1)) > 0.
5 The rank ondition when Φy = 0
5.1 Preliminary property
Lemma 4 Let P be a polynomial (and more generally, a C1 funtion), and λ a simple root of this polynomial: P (λ) = 0
but P ′(λ) 6= 0. If we add a real quantity q suiently small to the polynomial, it translates the root λ in the diretion
dened by the sign of:
−P ′(λ) q
+ dening a translation to the right, - to the left.
Proof Let us hoose δ > 0, arbitrarily small. P ′ being smooth, there exists w suh that ∀h ∈ [−w,w] |P ′(λ+h)| > δ.
This ensures that P is a bijetion from I = [λ− w, λ+ w] on P (I). Now, we denote by
q0 = min{|P (λ− w)|, |P (λ + w)|}.
Assume that P ′(λ) > 0. We dene, for every real q suh that |q| < q0
Pq : [−w,w]→ [P (λ− w) + q, P (λ+ w) + q]
t 7→ P (λ+ t) + q
Pq is a bijetion, and sine Pq(0) = P (λ) + q = q > 0 and (P (λ− w) + q)(P (λ + w) + q) < 0 by hoie of q, if q > 0
(resp. < 0), the root is shifted to the left (resp. to the right). The result is the same when P ′(λ) < 0. 
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Figure 4: Case 1
5.2 General values of γ, ξ = 0
For the sake of larity, we begin with the study of Pγ,0, that we denote by Pγ in this setion. Before giving the main
theorem of this part and its proof, let us loate the roots of P0 with respet to the ones of Q, denoted by r
±
Q. There
are exatly 14 possible ongurations: 4 ongurations just for the roots of P0, eah of this onguration leading to
several possibilities, depending on the loation of r±Q.
Theorem 1 For every vetor X ∈ DX and for every γ > 0, Pγ satises property (i): three of its roots are stritly
out of D and the other one is stritly in D.
Proof
Real roots of Pγ The gures (4), (5) and (6) show all the possible ongurations for P0. Remembering that
Pγ = P0 + γλwQ, we onsider the four following fats:
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Figure 5: Case 2
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Figure 6: Cases 3 and 4
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 with γ inreasing, a root of Pγ an never ross a root of Q: otherwise it stays on the root of Q (we add a null
quantity with γ inreasing),
 Q is stritly negative between its two roots, namely on
]
r−Q; r
+
Q
[
, positive outside its roots,
 the roots of P0, and more generally of Pγ are moving aording to lemma (4),
 starting from the ases 1 or 2, and inreasing γ, X being kept onstant, two of the real roots melt and disappear
to reate two omplex roots for a given value of γ.
With those observations, one an hek easily that, starting from P0:
 in the ases 1 and 3, the root smaller than one is trapped in ]0, 1[, while the root 1 moves toward the right to
beome one of the root outside D,
 in the ase 2 and 4, the root 1 moves toward the left to beome the root in D,
 all the real roots of P0 stritly greater than one annot enter the interval ]0, 1[.
Those observations remain true when inreasing γ without any limit.
Complex roots of Pγ The omplex roots of P0 lie outside the unit disk D (see Lemma 3). With γ > 0 we show
that the omplex roots of Pγ an not ross the unit irle. We proeed by ontradition and assume that for a given
γ, the root z is on the unit disk.
Assumption 4 There exist γ > 0 and z ∈ D suh that Pγ(z) = 0.
Under this assumption, let us study:
Pγ(z)
z − 1 = R0(z) + γλw
Q(z)
z − 1 = R0(z) + γλw
Q(z)(z¯ − 1)
|z − 1|2
=
1
|z − 1|2
[
R0(z)|z − 1|2 + γλwQ(z)(z¯ − 1)
]
ℑ
(
Pγ(z)
z − 1
)
=
1
|z − 1|2
[ℑ(R0(z))|z − 1|2 + γλwℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1))]
Taking z belonging to the unit irle z = cos θ + i sin θ, we obtain:
ℑ(R0(z))|z − 1|2 + γλwℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)) = 2(1− cos θ)ℑ(R0(z)) + γλwℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)). (24)
Thanks to properties 7 and 11, we know that the two quantities on the right-hand side are stritly positive on the unit
disk and that their sum annot be equal to zero. Hene, assumption 4 is false. 
5.3 General values of ξ, γ = 0
We study in this setion P0,ξ denoted in this setion Pξ.
Pξ(t) = P0(t) + ξ λp S(t)
The following result holds
Theorem 2 For all given X ∈ DX , ∀ ξ > 0, Pξ satises property (i): three of its roots are stritly out of the unit
disk D and the other one is stritly inside.
Proof The proof is symmetri to that of theorem 1. 
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5.4 Rank ondition
Lemma 5 ∀ γ ≥ 0, ∀ ξ ≥ 0, if γ 6= 0 or ξ 6= 0 then Pγ,ξ satises property (i).
Proof
Complex roots If P0 satises (ii), the omplex roots of Pγ,ξ stay outside D. To prove it, we an use the exat same
proof as for lemma 3, by adding the ontribution of S to the equation (24). We obtain that on the disk:
ℑ(R0(z))|z − 1|2 + γ λw ℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)) + ξ λp ℑ(S(z)(z¯ − 1)) =
2(1− cos θ)ℑ(R0(z)) + γλw ℑ(Q(z)(z¯ − 1)) + ξ λpℑ(S(z)(z¯ − 1)) (25)
and due to property 11 we know that the quantity we added is stritly positive and the same onlusion holds.
Real roots To get the polynomial Pγ,ξ, one starts from P0, goes to Pγ , and nally obtains Pγ,ξ. We already proved
that Pγ satises the required property. Now, adding ξλwS to this polynomial, we study the evolution of the roots. As
the roots of S an not be rossed, the situation is the exat same as previously: denoting by r±γ the two real roots of
Pγ , we an see that the four following situations:
 r−γ < r
−
S < 1 < r
+
S < r
+
γ
 r−γ < r
−
S < 1 < r
+
γ < r
+
S
 r−S < r
−
γ < 1 < r
+
S < r
+
γ
 r−S < r
−
γ < 1 < r
+
γ < r
+
S
lead to a stable onguration, namely one root in ]0, 1[, three out of D. 
Theorem 3 For every X ∈ DX , for all admissible values of γ and ξ (namely suh that φp+ξ > 0 and 1−φp+γ > 0),
γ + ξ > 0 if and only if Pγ,ξ satises property (i).
Proof Any point of the domain Dp,w an be reahed starting from a point on the axis φp + φw = 1 and adding
positive values of ξ and γ (Figure 1). Hene, the ending point of any path using a negative value of ξ or γ, but suh
that γ + ξ > 0 an be reahed with a path suh that both γ and ξ remain positive. In whih ase Lemma 5 applies
and φp + φw > 1 is a suient ondition to ensure that Pγ,ξ satises the required property for the uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
By similar reasoning, it is a neessary one: any polynomial Pγ,ξ satisfying property (i) has been reahed starting from
a polynomial P0. If we ome bak to the study of the dynamis of its roots, the ruial point is the movement of the
root 1 of P0. Aording to Lemma ?? and independently from the fat that it is the rst or seond real root of P0,
root 1 moves in the proper diretion if and only if:
ξλpS(1) + γλwQ(1) < 0
and omputing S(1) and Q(1), we nd that it requires that
(ξ + γ)λpλw(nw + np) > 0 (26)
namely that ξ + γ > 0. 
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6 The rank ondition in the ase Φy 6= 0
Even when the mandate of the Central Banker is just to ontrol the ination, as the European entral bank does,
in pratie, one an nd that the reation of this Central Banker to the output gap Φy is stritly positive. In suh
ountries, this reation is nevertheless smaller than the one of the Federal Reserve bank for instane, whose mandate
is to reat also to the output gap. Thus, in order for our uniqueness result to be useful as a benhmark for monetary
poliy, it should be a real improvement of the standard Taylor rule, i.e. being studied in the ase Φy > 0.
We are going to see that this ase is just a simple generalization of the ase Φy = 0.
A priori the frontier of indeterminay an be written φp + φw = 1 − θ, with θ positive and to be determined (Galí,
2008). The harateristi polynomial P of A is still dened by (12):
Pγ,ξ(t) = at
4 − bt3 + cγ,ξ,θt2 − dγ,ξ,θt+ eγ,ξ,θ.
with new oeients:
a = σβ2
b = β[κp +Φyβ + σ(2 + 2β + λp + λw)]
cγ,ξ,θ = κp[1 + λw + β(1 + φp + ξ)] + λwν[λp + β(1− θ − φp) + βγ] + Φyβ[λp + λw + 2 + β]
+ σ[1 + 4β + β2 + λp(1 + β) + λw(1 + λp + (2− φp − θ)β + βγ)]
dγ,ξ,θ = κp[1 + λw(1− θ) + φp(1 + β) + λwγ + (1 + β + λw)ξ] +
λwν[λp(1− θ) + (1− θ − φp)(1 + β) + (1 + β + λp)γ + λpξ] + Φy[1 + λw + λp + 2β]
+ σ[2β + 2 + λp + λw(1 + λp(1 − θ) + (1 + β)(1 − θ − φp) + (1 + β + λp)γ + λpξ)]
eγ,ξ,θ = σ[1 + λw(1− θ − φp)] + κpφp + κpξ + λwν(1 − θ − φp) + λw(σ + ν)γ +Φy.
There is now a third dimension (Φy) to the domain dened by Figure 1. We reover the deomposition (14) with
stritly idential polynomials Q and S by hoosing the baseline polynomial P0 aordingly. θ is set suh that P0(1) = 0,
whih implies that θ is proportional to Φy:
θ = Φy
(1− β)(λp + λw)
λwλp[σ + ν + np]
. (27)
Hene the limit ondition φp + φw = 1− θ denes a tetrahedron in the spae (φp, φw,Φy):
φp + φw +Φy
(1− β)(λp + λw)
λwλp[σ + ν + np]
= 1 φp ≥ 0, φw ≥ 0, Φy ≥ 0. (28)
This tetrahedron is the frontier of indeterminay when Φy 6= 0.
We keep the notation θ to ease the reading, though θ is given by (27). In the ase Φy = 0, the ruial ondition to
ensure the required properties on P0 is property 5. Property 12 generalizes this property when Φy 6= 0.
Property 12 For all X ∈ DX , P ′0(1) = 4a− 3b+ 2c− d and 6a− 3b+ c annot be both negative.
Proof We proeed again by ontradition and assume that 4a− 3b + 2c− d and 6a− 3b + c are both negative for a
given set of parameters X . After simpliation, we obtain:
p1 = 4a− 3b+ 2c− d = κp[λw(1 + θ) + (1− β)(1 − φp)] + λwν[λp(1 + θ)− (1− β)(1 − θ − φp)]
+ σ[(1− β)(λp + λw(φp + θ)) + λwλp(1 + θ)] + Φy[(2β − 1)(λp + λw)− (1 − β)2] < 0
and
p2 = 6a− 3b+ c = κp[λw + 1− β − β(1 − φp)] + λwν[λp + β(1 − θ − φp)]
+ Φyβ[2(1− β) + λp + λw] + σ[λpλw + (1− β)(1 − β + λp + λw)− β(λp + λw(φp + θ))] < 0.
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We denote by ci[r] the ofator of the variable r in the expression pi. Now, let us study the struture of those
inequalities
p1 = κpc1[κp] + σc1[σ] + λwνc1[λwν] + Φyc1[Φy] < 0 (29)
p2 = κpc2[κp] + σc2[σ] + λwνc2[λwν] + Φyc2[Φy] < 0 (30)
where
c1[κp] > 0, c1[σ] > 0, c2[λwν] > 0, c2[Φy] > 0, and
c1[λwν], c1[Φy], c2[κp] and c2[σ] are of unknown sign.
At least one of the ofator of unknown sign of (29) and one of the ofator of unknown sign of (30) has to be negative
to ensure the negativity of the whole expression p1 and p2. We begin with a simple property
Property 13 If c1[Φy] < 0, then c2[σ] ≥ 0.
Indeed, let us assume that c1[Φy] < 0 and c2[σ] < 0. This writes:
(2β − 1)(λp + λw) < (1− β)2
λpλw + (1 − β)2 + (1− β)(λp + λw) < β(λp + λw(φp + θ))
Inserting the rst inequality into the seond one, we obtain that
(2β − 1)(λp + λw) + λpλw + (1− β)(λp + λw) < β(λp + λw(φp + θ)) ⇒
λpλw − β(1 − θ − φp)
and this is not possible, onsidering that λw and λp are stritly positive. Hene, to ensure that p1 and p2 are stritly
negative, the possibilities are the following:
(I) c1[λwν] < 0 and c1[Φy] < 0, so c2[σ] ≥ 0 and c2[κp] < 0.
(II) c1[λwν] < 0 so c2[σ] ≥ 0 and c2[κp] < 0. c1[Φy] ≥ 0.
(III) c1[λwν] < 0 and c1[Φy] ≥ 0.
Let us rule out those ases in the order.
Assumption 5 c1[λwν] < 0 and c1[Φy] < 0, so c2[σ] ≥ 0 and c2[κp] < 0.
This implies:
[λw(1 + θ) + (1 − β)(1− φp)]κp < Φy[(1− β)2 − (2β − 1)(λp + λw)]+
λwν[(1 − θ − φp)(1− β)− λp(1 + θ)] − σ[(1− β)(λp + λw(φp + θ)) + λwλp(1 + θ)] = M
and
[β(1− φp)− λw − (1− β)]κp > s[λpλw + (1− β)(1 − β + λp + λw)− β(λp + λw(φp + θ))]+
λwν[λp + β(1 − θ − φp)] + Φyβ[2(1 − β) + λp + λw] = m
Now, we ompute [λw(1 + θ) + (1 − β)(1 − φp)]m − [β(1 − φp) − λw − (1 − β)]M and prove that it is positive. For
that purpose, let us study the terms in fator of σ, λwν and Φy. For σ, we an see diretly that it is stritly positive
(beause of the negative sign of its ofator in M). For Φy, we obtain:
λw(1 + θ)β(2 + λp) + λ
2
w(1− β + βθ) + λw(1− β)(1 − β + λp)+
(1 − β)[(1 − β)2 − (2β − 1)(λp + λw)] + β2(1 − φp)(λp + λw) > 0
and nally, we obtain for λwν
λpλw(1 + θ) + λp(1− β)(1 − φp) + λwβ(1 + θ)(1 − θ − φp) + λw(1− θ − φp)(1− β)+
(1− β)2(1− θ − φp) + λp(1 + θ)[β(1 − φp)− λw − (1− β)] > 0
Hene, the assumption 5 annot hold.
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Assumption 6 c1[σ] < 0 so c2[σ] ≥ 0 and c2[κp] < 0. c1[λwν] ≥ 0
Now we use Φy and obtain
[(1− β)2 − (2β − 1)(λp + λw)]Φy > κp[λw(1 + θ) + (1− β)(1 − φp)] + λwν[λp(1 + θ)− (1 − θ − φp)(1 − β)]+
σ[(1 − β)(λp + λw(φp + θ)) + λwλp(1 + θ)] = m
and
Φyβ[2(1− β) + λp + λw] < −σ[λpλw + (1 − β)(1− β + λp + λw)− β(λp + λw(φp + θ))]
− λwν[λp + β(1− θ − φp)] + κp[β(1 − φp)− λw − (1− β)] = M.
We proeed as previously and ompute β[2(1−β)+λp+λw]m− [(1−β)2− (2β− 1)(λp+λw)]M . It is straightforward
to see that the ofators of σ and λwν are positive. The ofator of κp is
βλw(1 + θ)[2(1− β) + λw + λp] + β(1 − β)2(1− φp) + β2(1− φp)(λp + λw)+
λw(1− β)[(1 − β)2 − (2β − 1)(λp + λw)] > 0
beause all the terms involved are positive. As previously, we get a ontradition and assumption 6 annot hold.
Assumption 7 c1[λwν] < 0 and c1[Φy] ≥ 0
Now, we have to use λwν. We dene
[(1− θ − φp)(1− β)− λp(1 + θ)]λwν > κp[λw(1 + θ) + (1− β)(1 − φp)] + Φy[(2β − 1)(λp + λw)− (1 − β)2]+
σ[(1 − β)(λp + λw(φp + θ)) + λwλp(1 + θ)] = m
and
[λp + β(1 − θ − φp)]λwν < κp[λw + 1− β − β(1 − φp)]− Φyβ[2(1 − β) + λp + λw]
− σ[λpλw + (1− β)(1 − β + λp + λw)− β(λp + λw(φp + θ))] = M
The ofator of Φy in [λp + β(1− θ− φp)]m− [(1− θ− φp)(1− β)− λp(1 + θ)]M is stritly positive, and we just have
to ompute the ofators of σ and κp. The ofator of σ is:
λp(1− β) + λpλw(1− β)(φp + θ) + λpλwβ(1 + θ)(1 − θ − φp) + λpλw(1− β)(1− θ − φp)+
λ2pβ(1 + θ) + λpλwβ(1 + θ)(φp + θ) + (1 − β)2(1 − θ − φp)(λp + λw) + (1− β)3(1 − θ − φp)
− λp(1 + θ)(1 − β)2 − λp(1 + θ)(1 − β)(λp + λw).
The annoying terms are the one of the last line, beause of their negative sign. But using the fat that c1[λwν] < 0,
whih writes
λp(1 + θ) < (1− β)(1− θ − φp)
we get that the fourth line is greater than:
−(1− β)3(1− θ − φp)− (1 − β)2(1 − θ − φp)(λp + λw)
and those terms exatly anel the one of the third line. Hene the ofator of σ is stritly positive. Now we ompute
the ofator of κp. Note that if λw +1−β−β(1−φp) < 0 we immediately know that this ofator is positive. Hene,
we an assume that this quantity is positive. Hene, c2[σ] < 0, and that an be written
λw(1− β) + (1− β)2 < β(λp + λw(φp + θ)) − λpλw − λp(1− β)
The ofator of κp writes
2λpλw(1 + θ) + λw(1 + θ)β(1 − θ − φp) + λp(1 − β)(1 − φp) + β(1 − β)(1 − φp)(1 − θ − φp)+
(1− β)λp(1 + θ) + β(1 − φp)[(1− θ − φp)(1− β) − λp(1 + θ)]
− λw(1− β)(1 − θ − φp)− (1 − β)2(1− θ − φp)
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using the former inequality, the annoying terms on the third line are greater than
λpλw(1 − θ − φp) + λp(1− β)(1 − θ − φp)− βλp(1− θ − φp)− βλw(φp + θ)(1 − θ − φp)
we have diretly that
−βλw(φp + θ)(1 − θ − φp) + βλw(1 + θ)(1 − θ − φp) > 0.
Now we use
λp(1 + θ) < (1− θ − φp)(1 − β)
to obtain that
−βλp(1− θ − φp) + β(1 − β)(1 − φp)(1− θ − φp) > −β(1 − β)(1− θ − φp)2 + β(1 − β)(1− φp)(1 − θ − φp) > 0
hene, the ofator of κp is also stritly positive. 
From property 12, the deomposition of polynomial P , the denition of its oeients and the denition of θ (27), all
the developments derived in the ase Φy = 0 apply and theorem 3 an be generalized.
Theorem 4 For every X ∈ DX , for all admissible values of γ and ξ (namely suh that φp+ξ > 0 and 1−θ−φp+γ > 0
with θ = Φy
(1−β)(λp+λw)
λwλp[σ+ν+np]
> 0), γ + ξ > 0 if and only if Pγ,ξ,θ satises property (i).
In other words, the neo-Keneysian model with staggered pries and wages (1) to (5) has a unique solution under
rational expetations if and only if Φp +Φw +Φy
(1−β)
(nw+np)
(
1
λp
+ 1
λw
)
> 1.
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A General elements on neo-Keynesian models for monetary poliy solved
under rational expetations
This paper was written as a ollaboration between an eonomist and an applied mathematiian. This appendix provides
the neessary denitions to set our problem for someone not familiar with neo-Keynesian models for monetary poliy
solved under rational expetations.
Denition 1 (Dynami Stohasti General Equilibrium Models (DSGE)) A DSGE model is a set of equa-
tions whih desribes jointly the short term utuations of key maroeonomi variables (growth, ination, interest
rate...). The dynami of these variables, referred to as endogenous variables, will depend on their past, present and
foreast values, but also on exogenous variables (shoks), whose dynami is not desribed by the model.
In this lass of models are neo-Keynesian models, partiularly useful in the ontext of monetary analysis and Real
Business Cyle models in whih nominal variables (in partiular pries) are supposed exible.
These models borrow from miroeonomists their modelling of dierent eonomi agents (households, rms, govern-
ments, banks, monetary authority...) on dierent markets (goods, assets, labour...). They have triggered an extensive
literature at the frontier between eonomis and applied mathematis.
Eonomi deisions, suh as savings, investments, onsumption, wage setting, will then be written as funtions of the
past and present values of various eonomi variables and the expetation formed by the deiding agent over the future
values of some of these eonomi variables. These latter variables will be referred to as forward looking variables. For
instane, a household may inrease its savings and redue today's onsumption if it believes the remuneration of its
savings will inrease tomorrow.
To solve suh a model, one must dene how agents form their expetations over the future. One way to dene this
funtion is to make the (strong) assumption that every eonomi agent knows the others' funtions of deision and
will form expetations ompatible with them.
7
As a onsequene, all agents will form the same expetations.
To understand better the onept of expetations in this framework, it is important to point out the stohasti dimen-
sion of DSGE models, whih ontains two types of variables
8
.
Endogenous variables are the result of the agents' deisions (onsumption, pries, prodution, savings, investments...).
Their dynami is desribed by the model.
Exogenous ones are perturbations, or shoks on the endogenous variables whih are not explained in the model (oil
shok, hange in the bargaining power of trade unions, sal hanges, soer team winning the world up, hurrianes
destroying houses or fatories...). These variables will be summarized with random variables (usually iid white noises)
impating the eonomy in various ways.
Sine the realizations of these random variables are not known in advane, agents must try to guess them. From these
guesses, they an dedue future values of the endogenous variables.
Denition 2 (Rational expetations) The expetations mentioned so far are alled rational expetations.
They are the statistial operator expetation (or rst moment), over the distribution of possible realizations of the
exogenous variables, onditional on the values of the endogenous and exogenous variables up to now and the equations
of the model, whih we will denote E(.|t)
To sum up, if the endogenous variables, i.e. the variables of interest, are gathered in the vetorX(t), and the exogenous
variables in the vetor z(t) our model an be written as
E(X(t+ 1)|t) = AX(t) +Bz(t) (31)
The vetor X an inlude endogenous variables at the urrent and the previous period to allow for the representation
of the model above, in whih ase the number of forward looking variables will be stritly lower than the dimension of
X . The omponents of the vetor z(t) are simply the dierent exogenous variables at the urrent period. The matrix
B desribes the way in whih these shoks (the exogenous variables) impat the endogenous variables.
7
This idea is attributed to Robert Luas (Luas, 1976) and has been a ornerstone of maroeonomis sine then.
8
A variable being a funtion of time, a sequene indexed by time or a time series, depending on where you ome from in siene.
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A solution to suh a model is a trajetory of endogenous variables ompatible with the equations of the model (inlud-
ing the expetation mehanism) for any realization of the exogenous variables over time. It is not unique a priori.
The non-uniqueness of the solution would mean that in suh an eonomy, there an be spontaneous utuations, as
agents beliefs or oordination "jump" from one solution to another. Suh equilibria are alled sunspot equilibria and
are problemati as they inrease the volatility of the eonomy (Woodford, 1987).
An important harateristi of the model is the number of forward looking variables, i.e. the variables upon whih
the agents must form some expetations. In a seminal paper of 1980, Blanhard and Kahn have shown that there is
a unique solution to model (31) if and only if there are as many forward looking variables as eigenvalues of A whih
are stritly larger than one in modulus.
Theorem 5 (Blanhard, Kahn) We onsider a linearised DSGE model:
E(X(t+ 1)|t) = AX(t) +Bz(t) (32)
in whih X gather endogenous variables and z exogenous variables. If solved under rational expetations, this model
has a unique solution if and only if there are as many forward looking variables in X as there are eigenvalues of A
whih are stritly larger than one in modulus.
DSGE models are widely used in entral banks to enlighten the ondut of monetary poliy. Indeed, suh models
provide a normative framework to analyse the eet of the Central Bank on the eonomy and desribe how its behaviour
an be optimal, that is maximize a welfare riterion.
Denition 3 (Central Bank and monetary poliy) A entral bank is a politial institution. Historially, these
institutions have been reated to print and issue the money needed for eonomi transations. Nowadays, they also
usually serve ontrol and regulation purposes on the private banking system.
More important for this paper is the entral bank's role in onduting monetary poliy : by setting the interest rate at
whih it lends money to private banks, the entral banks an ontrol ination and ativity. The hoie of this short
term interest rate is the monetary poliy instrument through whih the entral bank monitors (though imperfetly) the
eonomy.
For instane, the European entral bank's
9
mandate is to maintain prie stability, understood as an average ination
of onsumption pries lower but lose to 2%.
(Taylor, 1993) showed that the Federal Reserve (the USA Central Bank) monetary poliy is to set its interest rate
following a funtion of prie ination and the level of prodution.
Denition 4 (Taylor rule) The Taylor rule is a funtion whih desribes monetary poliy deisions, i.e. the hoie
of the interest rate by the Central Banker, as a linear funtion of ination and output:
it = i
∗ + φππt + φyyt
where i, i∗, π, y are the interest rate set, the interest rate target of the Central Banker, prie ination and output gap10.
Many variations of this rule have been studied, using expeted future ination, output growth, over four quarters
ination...
(Taylor, 1993) argues that this rule is a good benhmark for monetary poliy ommittees. Indeed later researh have
shown that suh a rule is optimal in the standard neo-Keynesian model for monetary poliy analysis (Woodford, 2001).
Another key issue is the uniqueness of the model's solution: the solution is unique if and only if the model satises
the ondition of theorem (5) also known as the rank ondition or Blanhard and Kahn ondition. On the standard
neo-Keynesian model for monetary poliy analysis, it has been shown that this ondition solely depends on the Cen-
tral Banker's poliy rule. Numerially on more omplex models, we generally nd that ensuring the uniqueness of the
9
http://www.eb.int/press/govde/html/index.en.html
10
The output gap is the deviation of output (i.e. prodution) from its potential or optimal value. It aptures the extend to whih the
eonomy is overheating.
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solution relies ruially on the Central Banker. This result is known as the Taylor priniple: the Central Banker's
reation to prie ination must be higher than one. More simply, it means that if ination inreases by 1 point, the
Central Banker should inrease its interest rate by more than 1 point.
In this paper we determine the neessary and suient onditions to ensure the uniqueness of the solution to a model
less onstrained than the standard neo-Keynesian model for monetary poliy analysis. This model is borrowed from
(Ereg et al., 2000) and (Galí, 2008), it diers from the standard framework by inluding wage rigidities in addition
to prie rigidities. In this model the Central Banker aims at stabilizing altogether prie and wage ination and output,
so we onsider a poliy rule reating to these three endogenous variables. We show that the neessary and suient
ondition to ensure the uniqueness of the solution depends only on the reation funtion of the Central Banker, i.e.
on how the interest rate is set.
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